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In a troubled time, the Common agricultural policy 
(CAP) again decisively influences farms’ strategic choic-
es. Therefore, the need to enhance the net farm income 
(NFI) has remained one of its cornerstones. The so-called 
“national flexibility” offered the opportunity to improve 
consistency between national targets and political deci-
sions to allow a greater effectiveness of public resources. 
These tasks were particularly intricate for the Italian Gov-
ernment, which had to face the consequences of the over-
all reduction of ceilings for direct payments. Considering 
that the choice of a specific internal convergence model 
affects the profitability of many farms, this represents one 
of the most relevant decisions Italy had to take.
The article aims at analysing and comparing how con-
vergence models might differently impact on net farm 
incomes.
1. Introduction
Although the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had shifted from CMOs 
(Common market organizations) towards direct payments, in the last two 
decades, by leaving its previous productive approach for embracing a more 
competitive, environmental friendly, and market oriented attitude, the need 
to enhance the net farm income (NFI) has remained one of its cornerstones 
(Tranter et al., 2007; Lowe et al., 2010; Henke and Coronas, 2011). Even more 
so, in such a troubled period, the CAP cannot stop supporting the European 
farmers and their activities, since it again decisively influences farms’ strategic 
choices, by indirectly orienting the management of natural input, production 
dynamics and the nature of buyer-supplier relationships (Bartolini and Viaggi, 
2013; Kazukauskas et al., 2013; Raggi et al., 2013). In November 2010, the Eu-
ropean Commission firmly stated that, in the future, the CAP would remain a 
fundamental common policy structured on two complementary pillars1, func-
1 Communication (COM) no 672 (final) from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions of 18 November 2010 “The CAP towards 2020: meeting the food, natural resources and 
territorial challenges of the future”.
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tional and strategic targets in the changeable and challenging world of the 21st 
century (Huang et al., 2010; Rizov et al., 2013). At the same time, CAP Reform 
2014-2020 has introduced new important elements into the architecture of di-
rect payments2 (Westhoek et al., 2013). Indeed, starting from January 2015, 
the current SPS (Single Payment Scheme) has definitely been replaced by an 
innovative system of direct payments with eight components3 (three manda-
tory and five optional). This new target-oriented approach aims at better link-
ing every payment with a specific political objective (van Ittersum et al., 2008; 
Grant, 2010). 
Regulation (EU) No. 1307/2013 has recognised a strong mandate for 
each Member State (MS) for managing many aspects related to direct pay-
ments. The so-called “national f lexibility” provides the opportunity to im-
prove consistency between national targets and political decisions, so as to 
allow a greater effectiveness in the public resources spending (van Ittersum 
et al., 2008; Grant, 2010; Erjavec et al., 2011; Westhoek et al., 2013). These 
tasks may be particularly intricate for the Italian Government, which will 
have to face the consequences of the overall reduction of ceilings for direct 
payments and of the process of internal convergence. Therefore, Italy shall 
reconcile the need to balance the level of payments per hectare between ad-
ministrative regions, agricultural regions (mountain and hill versus plain) 
and agricultural sectors with increased requests for enhancement of the 
NFIs, in a sector where prices, incomes volatility and natural risks are re-
markable and the profitability levels are, on average, below those in the 
rest of the economy (Severini, Tantari, 2013). Considering that the choice 
of a specific internal convergence model – that strives for reducing the gap 
between the value of payments per hectare – will affect the profitability of 
many farms, this has represented one of the most relevant decisions Italy 
had to take. The present article aims at analysing and comparing how the 
convergence models that the Reg. (EU) No. 1307/2013 establishes might dif-
ferently impact on the NFIs.
2 Regulation (EU) No. 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 De-
cember 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes 
within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No. 73/2009.
3 These components are the basic payment scheme (mandatory), the payment for agricul-
tural practices beneficial for the climate and the environment (mandatory), the payment 
for young farmers (mandatory), the redistributive payment (optional), the coupled support 
(optional), the payment for areas with natural constraints (optional) and the small farmers 
scheme (optional). The eighth component is the crop-specific payment for cotton, which is 
available only for Spain, Portugal, Greece and Bulgaria.
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2. Methods
A plausible and realistic assessment of the economic impacts ascribable to 
the new reform of direct payments requires a strict application of the technical 
mechanisms provided by the above-mentioned Regulation. It has introduced 
three alternative convergence models (art. 25):
1. a flat rate basic payment (FRBP) by 2015, without a convergence in steps;
2. a FRBP by 2019, with convergence in steps, during the 2015-2019 “transi-
tion period”4;
3. a partial convergence, also called the “Irish model” (IrM), that increases the 
basic payment below 90% of the national average by 1/3 of the difference 
between their current payment and 90% of the national average by 2019 
due to a proportional decrease in payments above the average. Moreover, 
this model introduces a “stop loss mechanism” that reduces losses (no more 
than 30% of their initial value in 2015) for high payment entitlements.
While the calculation of both FRBP models is not particularly complex, 
conversely, the mechanism of the IrM depends on two main parameters: the 
initial unit value of payment entitlements (IUV) and the national unit value 
(NUV). In 2019, this latter value has amounted to approximately 180 €/ha5 in 
Italy, simply determined by the following formula:
(X / Y) * (P / R) (1)
where X is the national ceiling for the basic payment scheme for the year 2015, 
Y is the national ceiling for 2015, P is the national ceiling for the basic pay-
ment scheme for calendar year 2019 and R is the number of allocated payment 
entitlements in 2015, excluding those allocated from the national reserve.  
The value of payment entitlements for farmers in the 2015-2019 period will 
depend on the IUV6, which can be set up as follows:
(x / y) * (A / B) (2)
4 Because this model will produce the same effects as the previous one in 2020, henceforth, 
FRBP by 2015 and FRBP by 2019 are considered as a unique model of internal convergence.
5 This value is obtained considering that the eligible utilized agricultural area amounts to 12 
million hectares, the national ceiling amounts to 3.902 Mio € in 2015 and to 3.704 Mio € in 
2019. Moreover, the basic payment is 58% of the national ceiling. 
6 Indeed, it represents a sort of reference value that allows for calculating payment. If the 
IUV is less than the NUV, then the direct payments shall increase progressively, while they 
shall decrease if the IUV is greater than the NUV.
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where x is the national ceiling for the basic payment scheme for the year 2015, 
y is the amount of the payment for 2014 under the single payment scheme in 
the MS, A is the payment the farmer received in 2014 and B is the number of 
payment entitlements allocated in 2015, excluding those allocated from the na-
tional reserve.
In addition, it should be considered the payment for agricultural practices, 
beneficial for the climate and the environment, that receives a fix percentage 
(30%) of the annual ceiling. To obtain the greening payment the farmers will 
have to undertake three standard measures and it is always a flat rate payment 
in 1) and 2), but MSs may calculate it as a flat rate payment7 (IrM-FRG) or as 
a percentage of each individual farmer’s payment (IrM-InG) if 3) is chosen8. 
Moreover, it should also be considered the coupled support (art. 52). It depends 
on production (hectares, yields, number of heads) and is adopted to maintain 
certains levels of production in some sectors or regions, where specific types of 
farming or specific agricultural sectors undergo difficulties and are particularly 
important in terms of economic, and/or social, and/or environmental reasons. 
On such a legal and technical basis, a simulation model was implemented 
in Excel to determine the effects of the internal convergence models. The units 
of analysis are represented by some representative agricultural holdings, ana-
lyzed by main type of farming (TF9) (Cafiero et al., 2005). Some of these rep-
resent sectors that have usually received payment entitlements higher than the 
regional (and national) average payment per hectare (e.g., dairy cattle livestock 
and rice in Northern Italy, sugar beets in Central Italy and olive oil in South-
ern Italy), while some others are sectors with no payment entitlements or en-
titlements lower than the regional (and national) average payment per hectare 
(e.g., the wine, fruit and sheep sectors) (Severini and Tantari, 2013). 
To identify the main features of the representative farms, the 6th Agricul-
tural Census figures and the FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) da-
tabases (years 2010-2012) were employed (Sckokai and Moro, 2009; European 
Commission, 2012; Moro, Sckokai, 2013; Rizov et al., 2013; Severini, Tantari, 
2013). First, for each TF, the representative region (stratified by altitude zone) 
was identified as the one with the highest percentage of Standard Output. 
Second, analysing the FADN samples of the representative regions, the aver-
age UAA of representative farms was calculated, as were all the average values 
7 In this case greening payment amounts to 98 €/ha in 2015 and to 93 €/ha in 2020.
8 Both options, Irish model with flat rate greening (IrM-FRG) and Irish model with “indi-
vidual greening” (IrM-InG) are simulated. Obviously, in the latter case, farmers that hold 
high value entitlements shall receive a higher greening payment.
9 A classification of farms based on determining the percentage of the production standards 
of the various productive activities of the company with respect to its total standard output.
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(during the 2010-2012 period) of the main variables of interest (AWU, i.e. an-
nual work unit, SPS payments, coupled payments of Art. 68 and NFI). Third, 
descriptive statistics of each variable were determined with SPSS, and the av-
erage characteristics of the representative farm were identified. At last, these 
data were inserted into a simulator that considers all the Italian Government 
decisions on direct payments10. The final output shows how direct payments 
vary during 2015-2020, thus providing the possibility to analyse how the 
ceteris paribus internal convergence models differently affect 1) NFI, 2) NFI/
UAA and 3) NFI/AWU. 
3. Results
The analysis of the 6th Agricultural Census database figures allowed the 
identification of eight administrative regions where representative farms’ fea-
tures should be investigated (Tab. 1). These are five Northern Italy regions 
(Piedmont, Lombardy, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna), and 
three Southern Italy regions (Calabria, Sardinia and Sicily11). As for altimetric 
areas, plain was selected six times, while hill and mountain were, respective-
ly, selected twice and once. Afterwards, based on the FADN database, selected 
variables (UAA, SPS payments, NFI, AWU and – where necessary – the cou-
pled support of art. 68) of each representative region were calculated. All these 
data represent the average features of the representative farms to be inserted, as 
input, into the simulator. Special attention must be paid to the various weights 
of direct payment with respect to the NFI in the observed TF. There are TFs 
with a high ratio of direct payments/NFI – above all, TF 162 (115,7%), TF 460 
(71,5%) and TF 152 (61,4%) – that are definitely more responsive to a decrease 
in direct aid and TFs that, conversely, show a low ratio of direct payments/
NFI – above all, ET 351 (4,3%), ET 361 (9,4%) and ET 352 (12,3%) – and are 
consequently less subjected to any change in the level of the CAP direct sup-
port (Tab. 1). In detail, TFs with a high incidence of direct payment on NFI 
are usually those that received SPS payments greater than the national average 
10 The basic payments are 58% of the national ceiling, young farmers payment takes approxi-
mately 1%, and greening receives a fixed percentage (30%). Concerning optional payments, 
coupled support is 11% (of which 50% is for animal husbandry, 26% for arable crops, 8% 
for protein crops and 16% for olive), while the redistributive and the payment for areas 
with natural constraints are not considered. The small farmers, scheme is also not conside-
red because, to finance it, MSs shall deduct the amounts to which the small farmers would 
be entitled from the other direct payment funds anyway. 
11 These latter, Lombardy and Emilia Romagna, were selected for more than one TF, as shown 
in table 1.
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payment per hectare (almost 300 €/ha) and, in many cases, those that benefit 
from coupled support; conversely, TFs with a low incidence of direct payment 
on NFI (<20%) received SPS payments lower than the national average payment 
per hectare without even receiving any coupled support.
The results show how differently NFIs and related indicators vary de-
pending on the internal convergence models implemented. Since the simula-
tion aims at comparing the NFI variation during 2010-1212/2020, and the two 
FRBP models will produce the same effects on direct payments by 2020, these 
latter were jointly analysed (table 2). The simulated production detects a wide 
difference between sectors, both taking into consideration the effects of each 
single convergence model and comparing the differences between the models.
The first approach underlines how representative farms of sectors, which 
historically hold high value entitlements, will face ceteris paribus drop in NFI, 
particularly  where direct payments are a relevant component of NFI. This ef-
fect is particularly evident in TF 162 (-28,4% due to IrM-InG, -36,6 due to IrM-
FRG and -51,8% to FRBP), TF 370 (-15,7% due to IrM-InG, -23,2 due to IrM-
FRG and -37,3% to FRBP) and TF 152 (-9% due to IrM-InG, -10,9 IrM-FRG and 
-14,2% to FRBP) and less pronounced in TF 362 (-7,2% due to IrM-InG, IrM-
FRG and FRBP) and TF 450 (-3,5% due to IrM-InG, -4,6% due to IrM-FRG and 
-3,7% to FRBP). However, the representative farms of the sectors which usually 
hold low value entitlements will experience a ceteris paribus increase of the 
NFI, with the lower the value, the larger the growth. This is the case of TF 352 
(+7,3% due to IrM-InG, +11,4% due to IrM-FRG and +19,5% to FRBP), while 
less evident effects are exhibited for TF 450 (+2,3% due to IrM-InG, +3,6% due 
to IrM-FRG and +6,3% to FRBP), TF 481 (+0,5% due to IrM-InG, +3,7% due to 
IrM-FRG and +10,1% to FRBP) and TF 351 (+0,3% due to IrM-InG, +1% due 
to IrM-FRG and +2,5% to FRBP). Apparently counterintuitive is the result of 
TF 460 where, although the SPS payment is higher than the national average 
payment per hectare in Italy, the simulation carried out shows that the NFI of 
the representative farm is expected to increase by 2020 (+5,7% due to IrM-InG, 
+4,3% due to IrM-FRG and +1,7% to FRBP). This outcome is because all the 
convergence models of direct payments will affect only the decoupled compo-
nent of payment received (735 €/ha) and not the coupled part that represents 
instead a large part of the direct support received from TF 460 (2.462 €/ha). In 
this case, the NFI is expected to increase by 2020 just because the negative ef-
fects due to the convergence models will be sufficiently contrasted by a further 
increase of the coupled support for cattle beef during 2015-202013.
12 FADN observation period.
13 The coupled payment per head increases from 42m1€ (average 2010-2012) to 46 € with the 
new coupled payment system. 
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The comparison between the simulated models of convergence also al-
lows a distinction between the two different typologies of farms: the ones that 
would benefit from the IrM models limiting the losses caused by FRBP mod-
els and the ones that, conversely, due to IrM models, would loose a relevant 
part of the advantage deriving from FRBP models (Tab. 2). The first group 
is composed by all the TFs with high value entitlements during the period 
2010-12 and, in most cases, a high incidence of direct payments with respect 
to NFI (i.e., TF 162 and TF 152); indeed, due to the stop-loss mechanism, the 
IrM models (especially the IrM-InG, since the greening payment is calculated 
as a percentage of farmers’ basic payment) offer a sort of protection to those 
categories of CAP beneficiaries (above all, specialist cereals, oilseeds, protein 
crops, root crops and specialist olive farms). 
However, to the second group belong all the TFs that benefit from IrM 
models but that could nonetheless benefit of FRBP models; this is the direct 
consequence of the above mentioned stop-loss mechanism, that for limiting 
losses of the biggest CAP beneficiaries hinders the increase of the smallest 
ones. Most of these TFs show, furthermore, a low incidence of direct payment 
on NFI (above all, TF 351, TF 361 and TF 352). Such a negative impact is par-
ticularly evident for TF 460m (+7,9% due to IrM-InG and +16,6% to IrM-FRG, 
instead of +34,1% due to FRBP), TF 352 (+7,3% due to IrM-InG and +11,4% 
to IrM-FRG, instead of +19,5% to FRBP) and TF 481 (+0,5% due to IrM-InG, 
+3,7% to IrM-FRG and +10,1% to FRBP) because, in the past, these sectors 
have not usually benefited from high value entitlements. In addition, there are 
two cases that are beyond the above highlighted connections. The first is TF 
362 (citrus), whose NFI does not vary depending on the internal convergence 
model adopted (-7,2% both with IrM models and FRBP); the other is TF 361 
(fruit, with some arable crops14) that goes from a negative NFI variation (-0,6 
due to IrM-InG) to positive ones (+0,1% and +1,4%) due respectively to the 
IrM-FRB model and to the two FRBP models.
In summary, the methodology allowed analysis of whether the representa-
tive farms of each TF do benefit from the internal convergence models and 
which is the most convenient model for each of them. There’s a clear relation-
ship between the way the IrM models affect NFI variation and the differences 
between the effects on the NFIs of the different models. Figure 1 shows how 
the TFs with high value entitlements benefit from the IrM-FRG models. In-
deed, this model reduces the impacts on NFI of the internal convergence 
14 Arable crops such as wheat, maize and soybean augment the amount of direct payments 
that the representative farm of TF 361 received in the past. Such a detail explains the level 
of title entitlements observed (258 €/ha), higher than that of fruit farms without arable 
crops.
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process, but in the meanwhile still guarantees a greening payment consistent 
with its purposes – namely without linking this payment to the value of enti-
tlements held by farmer – and capable to really remunerate public goods also 
produced by the TFs with low level entitlements.
In addition Figure 2, that compares the NFI effects of the IrM-FRG with 
the IrM-InG ones, clearly shows how this latter further disadvantages low level 
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entitlements, since besides limiting the internal convergence mechanism (due 
to the “stop loss mechanism”) it considers the greening as a percentage (30%) 
of the value entitlements, so as to support high value entitlements again. In 
this case, it should be noted that applying greening proportionally to the basic 
payment scheme makes this payment completely discriminatory, because the 
same efforts to provide a public good, made for instance by farms specialising 
in olive oil (TF 370) and wine farms (TF 352), are differently remunerated.
In conclusion, even though TFs with high value entitlements will be sub-
jected anyway to a decrease of the NFI due to the internal convergence pro-
cess, the decision of introducing contemporarily both the “stop loss mecha-
nism” (Irish model) and the “individual greening” (that is a greening as an 
offshoot of the basic payment scheme), has led to a double penalization for the 
TFs with low value entitlements.
In order to assess the effects on NFIs of the IrM-InG, Fig. 3 highlights two 
main groups of TFs, called “IrM-InG fans” and “IrM-InG opponents”. The 
first group (over the x-axis) includes all the representative farms that, due to 
the IrM-InG, increase their NFI (subgroup F1) or experience a decline in NFI 
less significant than the IrM-FRG and the FRBP models (subgroup F2). In this 
group there are many “CAP dependent” TFs that show a high incidence of di-
rect payments (coupled support included) with respect to NFI. In the second 
group (under the x-axis) there are, conversely, TFs that are “CAP independ-
ent” (low incidence of direct payments with respect to NFI and low or no cou-
pled support) and that, due to the IrM-InG, enhance NFI, but less than they 
could do with the IrM-FRG and the FRBP models (subgroup O1), or the farms 
that, due to the IrM-InG, face a drop in NFI instead of the increase produced 
through the other models (subgroup O2). All these subgroups may contribute 
to explain the purposes of the IrM-InG – that was introduced during the In-
terinstitutional debate on CAP (the so-called CAP Trilogue) and accepted by 
Italian policymakers as well – to weaken the drastic effects of FRBP models on 
“CAP dependent” farms with high value entitlements, by reducing economic 
resource transfer towards the TFs, historically with low value entitlements.
In conclusion, Figure 3 shows that the IrM-InG fans are mainly TFs with 
high levels of SPS payments, where these latter represent also a relevant com-
ponent of NFIs (above all, TF 152 and TF 162). These TFs reduce their losses 
– or even increase their NFIs (i.e., TF 460) – benefitting, in many cases (i.e., 
cattle beef, rice, olive oil, durum wheat, sugar beet and dairy milk), from the 
new Italian coupled payments system15. However, the IrM-InG opponents are 
15 Established in July 2014 by the document “The new CAP: national choice on Reg. (EU) no. 
1307/2013” (available in Italian).
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represented by all sectors that did not benefit from the 2003 Fischler Reform 
(above all, mountain animal husbandry) and that – although improving their 
NFIs – miss a great chance to decisively enhance the incidence of direct pay-
ments on their NFIs, in order to be rightly remunerated for the provision of 
public goods, and definitely improve their economic results.
4. Conclusions 
CAP 2014-2020 has introduced a relevant change in the architecture for 
direct payments, both imposing an internal convergence process and estab-
lishing a strong mandate for each MS, to improve the effectiveness of the 1st 
Pillar of the CAP. Simulations undertaken by employing the FADN database 
demonstrated that all the internal convergence models worsen the profitabil-
ity of some specific “CAP-dependent” TFs (above all, root crops, olive oil, rice 
and dairy milk) in some Italian regions with high level entitlements (above all, 
Calabria and Lombardy), while internal convergence simultaneously contrib-
utes positively to the NFIs of some traditional “CAP-independent” production 
(wine) and eco-friendly activities (mountain animal husbandry). Nevertheless, 
the present paper verified that losses or gains for each TF will consistently 
vary depending on the adopted convergence model and that the IrM models, 
more than the FRBP models, protect the NFIs of the biggest CAP beneficiaries 
(where NFI is deeply affected by SPS and coupled support) and, at the same 
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time, they limit the NFI increases of the smallest ones (where, conversely, di-
rect payments represent a small component of the NFI). 
Among the IrM models, the IrM-InG seems to be less justifiable and con-
sistent with the CAP’s objective to foster the provision of public goods than 
the IrM-FRG. Indeed, this latter model considers the greening payment as a 
f lat rate payment, that is each hectare receives the same direct aid, while 
the IrM-InG gives a greening payment that depends on the value of the en-
titlements. Therefore, while the IrM-FRG offers a uniform support for public 
goods, the IrM-InG supports largely TFs with high value entitlements, often 
highly represented by intensive productions (i.e. rice, cereals, cattle livestock, 
dairy milk) traditionally located in the plains, to the detriment of production 
equally (or even mainly) capable to deliver environmental benefit (i.e. vine-
yard, sheep, livestock in the mountains).
In conclusion, while on the one hand, the IrM models maintain a sort of 
enduring relationship with the old SPS, which is too far from the future chal-
lenges of the CAP, on the other hand, the analyses conducted in the present 
work clearly show that the partial convergence – together with some specific 
measures of the new coupled payment system adopted in Italy – is the only 
solution for reducing the negative effects that FRBP models could have on the 
NFIs of many strategic agricultural sectors in Italy (here called “CAP-depend-
ent” sectors), where direct payments have indeed traditionally played a strong 
role of income support. Nonetheless, the choice for a flat greening rate, instead 
of an “individual greening”, would appear more logical and effective for the 
above-mentioned reasons. 
All these facts considered, the political decision to apply the IrM-InG and 
to provide most of the new coupled payments to these “CAP-dependent” sec-
tors, to address the reduction in the CAP budget and the main consequences 
of a redistribution of scarce financial resources between farmers in the 2015-
2020 period, is a clear signal that Italian policymakers preferred to enhance 
farm incomes in a time of turbulence rather than to foster the provision of 
public goods.
This option might turn out to be reasonable and justifiable, provided 
that instruments will be used as a type of (temporary) accompanying meas-
ure towards 2020, when the application of a flat rate model of income support 
should be inevitable for each MS, Italy included. 
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